Introduction
The historic visit of U.S. President Richard Milhous Nixon to the People's Republic of China in 1972 solidified a growing diplomatic position in the context of a possible SinoSoviet split. This visit was a monumental accomplishment in terms of establishing American diplomatic relations with mainland China. At the end of the visit the two governments issued a unique foreign policy document named the Shanghai Communiqué. Within the document the two governments discussed various topics, most importantly the Taiwan Question.
Within the Shanghai Communiqué both governments acknowledged and reviewed their "long-standing and serious disputes" (US-PRC, 1972) . The Taiwan Question was outlined as the most "crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations" between the two countries" (US-PRC, 1972) . The policy decisions outlined within the Shanghai Communiqué are laid out in Table 1 .
Since this declaration, China has longed for a concise and resolute conclusion to the Taiwan Question. The American government has stated in numerous publications that a resolution to the Question is necessary but must be conducted peacefully. While in pursuit of a peaceful answer to the Taiwan Question, the United States has shown that it will stand by its Taiwanese ally and act in its defense. The Chinese government views America's support of Taiwan as an infringement on its sovereignty due to the territorial claims placed on Taiwan and has over time vehemently protested continued American support.
The American-Chinese relationship has been one of careful, strategic, exasperating maneuvers. These two governments' foreign policy efforts and the resulting relationship are similar to a playground. Both governments act like school children teasing each other with pokes and prods for the whole school (international community) to see. But within this "game" of reciprocal poking there are nearly 2 billion people, countless nuclear weapons, and vast armies. The best description of the US-Chinese relationship in regards to the Taiwan Question is "tit-for-tat."
Literature Review
The U.S.- Taiwan Following the 1979 Joint Communiqué and the official declaration of formalized relations, there were two major unresolved issues that hampered efforts to build a relationship between the two countries. The first sticking point between the American government and the PRC was the American policy of arming the Taiwanese government.
Throughout the process of establishing formalized relations, the issue of arms sales to Taiwan had not been resolved (US-China, 1982) . Additionally, by April of 1979, the US Congress sought the preservation of the American government's relationship with Taiwan (ROC).
To preserve the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, the United States Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Its intended purpose was to preserve a strong relationship with a vital Asian ally. The TRA reiterated the American policy regarding the defense of Taiwan as stipulated within the Mutual Defense Treaty. The Taiwan Relations Act also recognized the formalized relationship between the U.S. and China (PRC) following the Joint Communiqué. However, the Act established "informal" relations with Taiwan via the Taiwan Institute. The Taiwan Institute was intended to provide (as it still does) the Taiwanese government with de facto diplomatic relations with the United States. This American action seemingly acted strongly against the Diplomatic Relations Communiqué produced four months earlier.
Three years elapsed, and the Chinese and American governments followed their predecessors' footsteps and met to develop a third joint communiqué. The August 17
Communiqué of 1982 is the modern capstone for the U.S.-Taiwan-Chinese relationship regarding arms sales to Taiwan. As is common for diplomatic messages, both governments provide grandiose proclamations supporting previous joint diplomatic actions. Within this particular Communiqué, however, the U.S. government stated four important issues: it had no long-term intentions of selling arms to Taiwan, the arms sold would not exceed previous levels of arms sales in "either qualitative or in quantitative terms," the U.S. government would not increase the amount of arms sold to Taiwan, and the U.S. sought a peaceful resolution to the reunification process (U.S. -China, 1982) . China provided one important phrase: during the possible reunification process between mainland China and Taiwan, the PRC would "strive" for a peaceful solution but would not guarantee it (U.S.-China, 1982).
The August 17 Communiqué was celebrated by China and the United States, but it was extremely ambiguous. Both sides believed they came away from the conference with a victory. The Chinese government walked away feeling they had achieved a firm agreement in regards to state sovereignty and on a One-China policy (Kan, 2011) . The United States government believed the agreed-upon terms were only applicable if the Chinese accepted a peaceful reunification policy (Kan, 2011) .
Tit-For-Tat Overview
Tit-for-tat, or reciprocal actions, have been studied within many contexts, including business and international relations. The U.S.-China tit-for-tat relationship has played out for a substantial amount of time. A tit-for-tat relationship is one of actions taken and proportional retaliations to said behavior (Ward, 1990) . Stated by another, "Any stimulus by one actor may be expected to bring about a proportionate response in kind from the other" (Richardson, 1981) . Here, the definition I utilize is the Oxford English Dictionary's definition of reciprocal; "expressing mutual action" (Oxford English Dictionary, 2012) .
Reciprocal responses by nations are not always sector-determined. That is to say, a military stimulus can be met with economic or verbal retaliation (Pruitt, 1969) . Reciprocal responses may not be achieved for a substantial set of time. To summarize Ward's research, "The literature does not clearly distringuish between short and long term conceptions of reciprocity" (Ward, 1990) . Ward also concluded that reciprocity appears on an "expanded time scale" (Ward, 1990) . That is to say, interactions tend to ebb and flow over time.
International Pariahs
The term "international pariah state" has been successfully congealed with the idea of a rogue state. The definitions of both are abstruse and defined differently depending on place, time, and author. Within this context an international pariah state is labeled the same as a rogue state and thus interchangeable. The definition of a pariah state can be defined as a "hostile or seemingly hostile Third World state with large military forces and nascent WMD capabilities" (Klare, 1995) . Here, a rogue state acts outside of American interests and values within their specific region as well as the international system. The definition of "pariah states" essentially depends on the eye of the beholder, but includes human rights violations, lack of democratically-elected governments and democratic institutions, sponsoring terrorism, pursuing nuclear weapons, and being so isolated internationally that communication is done by multilateral talks.
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The reasoning behind selecting pariah states to investigate and not "adversaries" is due to the level of difficulty in accurately measuring the term "adversary." The term "adversary" has a duelist definition: either friendly rival or hated enemy. For example, during the U.S.-French dispute over NATO dominance in the late 1950s the French could be characterized as an adversary of the United States; when in reality they were allies engaged in a heated foreign policy dispute. The United States viewed the French as a friendly rival.
During the same time period, the USSR was becoming an ever-increasing enemy. Both were adversaries but neither were pariahs. Defining the adversary concept would be a formidable obstacle and is beyond the scope of this essay.
Action-Reaction
I feel that the tit-for-tat game can be traced all the way back to President Harry Jumping ahead 50 years, the game is still being played. This is expected because, "superpower interactions are comprised of many, many repeated plays of the same or similar games (Ward, 1990) ." The Chinese government does not hesitate to act against American stimuli in multiple policy domains. A recent military response by the Chinese can be found in their decision to stalk an American battle group (Peck, 2006) . A Chinese submarine stalked the USS Kitty Hawk and its battle group and surfaced within firing distance before being detected. The battle group at the time was in Southeast Asia along the coast of Okinawa, Japan.
The Chinese government also trumpets their stance against US-Taiwan arms sales by: publishing White Papers, allowing government officials to cause a publicized racket, and 
Sovereignty Threat
Chinese claims of infringement of state sovereignty by the United States due to its support of Taiwan fall within internationally recognized norms of a state system that were accepted during the Treaty of Westphalia. The PRC claims the island of Taiwan as a province of the mainland according to its One China Policy. China feels strongly that U.S.
intervention and the sale of arms to Taiwan are actions to support a secessionist movement.
This overt action violates their state right to territorial integrity. The action also is a violation of the hallowed belief that a state's border shall not be altered by interventionist means. If Taiwan successfully secedes from the mainland due to American support, China's border will be drastically altered.
American policy makers have felt a One China Policy is acceptable only if conducted in a peaceful manner. The American policy stance relates to China's hesitance to accept peaceful measures to accomplish their reunification efforts. The U.S. decision to protect Taiwan during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, subsequent interventions, and arms sales could be described in terms of violating state sovereignty.
Regional Flash Points
This issue of arms sales in the Asia-Pacific region is of great importance because of the growing focus of the American government on the Asia-Pacific region. "The future of politics will be decided in Asia" (Clinton, 2011) . The Pacific and Asia currently hold U.S.
interests economically, militarily, and socially. The U.S. is interested economically due to the vast market potential of the region and militarily because of the growing security risks in Asia.
2 Additionally, America will continue to be drawn to the region because of our longstanding and prosperous relationships and alliances.
These long-standing relationships have caused the vision of the United States foreign policy establishment to be fixed on the Asia/Pacific region since the Korean War. Today, the South China Sea is a hot-button issue within the realm of foreign policy decision-making.
Nearly all of the nations in the region have extensive land disputes. The Southeast Asia neighborhood consists of China, Cambodia, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. All these countries, besides Cambodia and Indonesia, stake a claim to the Paracel Islands, the Spratly Islands, or both. 3 The Paracel
Islands dispute rests with only China and Vietnam (Pham, 2010) . 4 The Spratly Islands are disputed multilaterally by Brunei, Taiwan, Malaysia, China, the Philippines, and Vietnam (Pham, 2010) .
The issue regarding these territorial disputes is founded in what is known as the "hydrocarbon factor" (Schofield, 2012) . The South China Sea has been tagged as the next Saudi Arabia (Mogato, 2012) . These disputes are exacerbated by the current occupation policies by most of these countries. The occupation of these islands has caused tense relations in the region for decades. Tensions have escalated in recent years following the discovery of untapped petroleum resources. Each country is trying to expand its boundaries as far into the South China Sea as possible. These claims are at times even beyond UNCLOS standards in hopes of establishing Exclusive Economic Zones (Beckman, 2010) . The South China Sea has become a competitive marketplace for natural gas and petroleum. The countries located within the South China Sea neighborhood are labeled as emerging economies and are attempting to establish a sense of energy security to feed those economic demands (Schofield, 2012) .
5
According to the 2010 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the South China Sea has the potential for 1400 Mb to 5000 Mb of petroleum to be extracted (USGS, 2010).
The occupational policies and the related tit-for-tat policies implemented by these countries are additional examples of potential flash points in the region. 6 Due to this increasingly unstable environment so close to Taiwan, there is American concern about events in the region. Additionally, any series of actions or stimuli could cause the U.S.-China-Taiwan reciprocal actions to spiral out of control into uncivil territory (Pearson, 1999) .
The threat of instability is compounded due to the increased military expenditures of those in the region. Between 1979 and 1989, the combined Gross National Product (GNP) of China, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, and others in the region increased by 166 percent (Klare, 1993) . The funds necessary for dramatic increases in military expenditures can be linked to the South China Sea's economic growth (Klare, 1993 American policymakers who want to fight China fire with U.S. fire: "A realist U.S. response will only contribute to an inexorable action-reaction cycle" (Shambaugh, 2011).
China's dominant policy analysts, the Nativists and Realist schools, are obsessed with power and security concerns. American analysts are equally concerned with similar issues.
Since both countries are ratcheting up their focus on security concerns there may be an increase in strategic competitiveness that hovers around the numerous flashpoints discussed earlier. "Escalating strategic competition could emerge quite unpredictably" and is thus extremely dangerous (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009). Due to this unpredictability, "uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities" (Mearsheimer, 2001 ).
This uncertainty can cause a security dilemma between two states. A security dilemma occurs when two or more states are in conflict with each other and are simultaneously attempting to increase their own security. While one state increases its security the other(s) will feel as though the action is threatening, thus leading the threatened state(s) to engage activities leading to perceived security increases. This can develop into an action-reaction cycle of ratcheting up security actions that can lead to war.
Theory
The Chinese government could respond in any number of ways to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, including economic, military, or social actions. China potentially could: The following is a discussion of these policy options.
In response to U.S. If the North begins to stockpile nuclear weapons China would lose its position as the only nuclear power in the region. China's government definitely does not want a strong nuclear presence in the North because they would have to make room at the head of the table for North Korea for regional decision-making. China's policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of another country could be threatened if they are seen meddling with a sovereign country (Lewis, 2010) . This would draw even more attention toward China because of their long and harsh opposition to such actions and would raise questions about their stance on Taiwan.
China's resource base is massive and has allowed the country to be relatively selfsufficient in terms of raw materials. China has access to the world largest minable reserves of the valuable metal tungsten. Currently, China produces about 85% of the world's tungsten materials (Saefong, 2006) . This material is a strategic necessity for two reasons:
 Usage within the economy
 Usage in the military
Tungsten is used by every industrialized economy in nearly ever sector for hard-metal applications, light bulbs, tools, dies, armor-piercing bullets, etc. If the U.S. were cut off from, or experienced drastic increases to the price of, tungsten, there would be drastic ramifications (Lifton, 2006) .
China would be hard-pressed to increase the price of tungsten so greatly that it could be used as a tactic against Taiwan arms sales. Commodities in the past have been used as diplomatic leverage, such as the Oil Embargo of 1973. Tungsten, however, is utilized by so many industrialized countries that this policy would not only threaten America but also would provide a challenge to China's relationships with other world economic powers. China lacks petroleum and uranium resources, and increasing the price of tungsten could cause a ripple effect that could haunt them.
As a response to U.S.-Taiwan arms sales, China may chose to focus narrowly on military actions. China's military is the world's largest, with 2.8 million in uniform (CNN World News, 1999) . In recent decades the PRC has allocated resources to modernize the military with retrofitted aircraft carriers and newly-developed stealth technology. To continue to overhaul the military the PRC must increase its expenditures. According to a new report, the Chinese military will spend over $100 billion for the first time in 2012 (Richburg, 2012) . However, China's military is still largely old and outdated. States has the largest defense budget of any country in the world and has been referred to as simply "impressive" (Nye, 2011) . For decades the U.S. has spent between $500 billion and $700 billion on defense budgets alone (The Economist, 2011; Cloud, 2012) . The U.S. also spends between $21 and $28 billion on foreign aid assistance per year (Wroughton, 2010) .
Recently, however, both budgets have been slashed due to Congressional "efforts" to decrease the US budget deficit. For the last three to four decades the Chinese government has pursued economic advancement, and riding on these coattails has allowed the military to prosper. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has taken advantage of this policy. Today, the PLA is essentially a commercial conglomerate with close ties to international corporations like Huawei
Technologies (Gertz, 2011; USCC Research, 2011) . They have become not only a formidable military but also a savvy business operation. The PLA has invested in arms manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, transportation, food production, and other lucrative business operations intended to expand their financial capabilities including the selling of arms (Bickford, 1994) . Utilizing the PLA to sell arms in response to Taiwan arms purchases from the United States would not only bring positive political windfalls domestically but also increase the resources flow to Norinco and other Chinese arms manufacturers.
These policy options would cause American decision-makers to train their eye away from Taiwan, but these actions would not follow in the traditional footsteps of PRC selfassurance. The reciprocal responses outlined above would cause negative or even negligible results. China's reaction to the American government selling arms to Taiwan must have the least amount of residual effects and the most positive outcomes. The only policy response that fits these characteristics is to sell arms to international pariah states.
Hypothesis
Arms sales by the U.S. government to the Taiwanese government will cause a reciprocal response, in terms of arms sales, from the Chinese government to an international pariah state.
Methodology Results
In terms of the hypothesis, both the U.S. and Chinese governments support nations considered pariahs by the international system. From China's viewpoint, Taiwan From the United States perspective, the North Korean government is a pariah and is supported by the PRC. 9 The North Korean government is a repressive, brutal, and totalitarian regime that allows few human or political rights. U.S. interest lies with a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, and the North balks at this notion. Thus, North Korea is considered a pariah state because their policies are not aligned with American interests. Along with North Korea, the governments of Syria, Libya, Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Sudan, and Myanmar are considered international pariah states here.
10
9 Utilizing the same US Department of State resources I could not find an exact number of countries that have official diplomatic relations with North Korea but the number is assumed to be relatively low. 10 North Korea and Cuba were investigated at all levels of my research but no data was available and were subsequently not included in any statistical outputs. This weighted average data gave me an estimate of the amount of money, in U.S. dollars, that was available to be spent on arms purchases in any given year by pariah states. more data may be perfect to solving this problem but it is also the most difficult to achieve.
To predict this model more accurately in the future I may want to use variables that showcased the domestic environment of Taiwan and mainland China.
In an attempt to overcome this sluggish data I needed to reevaluate the data I was including. I felt the weighted average was an acceptable control variable given the research topic, which led me to the countries I included in the analysis labeled as rogue states. I felt there had to be other governments that I could include. Due to the lack of statistical or substantive significance of my data I felt it was necessary to rerun the regression again without Iraqi or Venezuelan data points. The Iraqi data I utilized in Table 3 and Table 4 were limited. The data collected were from the end of the Ba'athist regime to the current transition period (following American troop withdrawal).
These data and the time period it represented were questionable in regards to Iraq's status as a rogue state. Thus, I removed Iraqi data points from all variables. The statistical results from this regression can be found in 
Conclusion
The data I collected have a series of limitations. First and foremost the data set has a low number of observations (n=22) 
